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A TALE OF Two CITIES:
Is LOZANO V. CITY OFHAZLETON THE JUDICIAL EPILOGUE TO THE
STORY OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION IN BEAUFORT
COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA?
"Immigration is a national issue."' District Judge Munley, writing in Lozano v. City
of Hazleton
"1 could no longer wait for the federal government to do anything .... Illegal
immigration is not a federal problem. It is a local issue. We deal with it every single
day."2 -Louis Barletta, Mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania
"When the federal government drops the ball on enforcing immigration laws, it's
up to the local governments to protect the taxpayers."'3 Starletta Hairston, former
member of the Beaufort County Council (South Carolina)
I. INTRODUCTION
It was the best of times. Having moved to Hilton Head only four years prior,
Starletta and William Hairston's self-created stucco business had earned nearly $1
million in 1997.' The Hairstons were investing in real estate, expanding their
business, and breaking ground on what was to be their 7,600-square-foot mansion.5
Yet it soon became the worst of times-Hairston began losing bids on stucco jobs,
and his business started to decline.6 The cause? Underbidding by competitor
companies, many of which employed or were operated by illegal immigrants.
Many of these workers, and even some of the business owners themselves, were
immigrants that at one time had worked for William Hairston; the workers who had
helped build Hairston's fortune were now chipping away at his financial fortress,
and it ultimately collapsed in 2002 when he was forced to close his Hilton Head
business.8
Current estimates for the number of illegal immigrants now living in the United
States range from 8 million to as many as 12 million. 9 As the numbers grow," so
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 523 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
2. JUDICIAL WATCH, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 5 (2007),
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2007/SR-lmmigration.pdf.
3. Fred Lucas, Feds Have Dropped Ball on Illegal Immigration, Say Local Governments,
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com/Politics/Archive/200703/
POL20070301 a.html.
4. See Miriam Jordan, Trading Places: How Immigration Upended Dreams of an Entrepreneur,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2006, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. Hairston and other subcontractors allege that under-the-table payments to illegal
immigrant workers save companies money in payroll taxes and worker's compensation costs, which
in turn allows the contractor to bid a lower price. See id.
8. Id.
9. 151 Cong. Rec. S7852 (daily ed. Jun. 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions). Some research
groups estimate as many as 12 to 38 million immigrants. See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, Illegal in the
US: Just How Many?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 16, 2006, at I ("Depending on the source,
1
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do the calls for a legislative response to the burgeoning problem of illegal
immigration. The inability of the federal government to address the problem has
prompted numerous state and local officials to try their own hand at regulating
immigration." According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, over
1,404 pieces of legislation dealing with immigration have been introduced across
the fifty states since January 2007, with 170 bills becoming law in forty-one
different states. 12 The regulations range from proscriptions on residential leasing to
illegal immigrants and penalties for businesses that employ illegal aliens to English-
only ordinances.
3
These small-town answers to the national immigration question have not gone
unnoticed nor have they been met with universal acceptance. Various organizations
and special interest groups have sued the municipalities over the validity and
constitutionality of the newly enacted laws. 14 The most notable challenge to a local
immigration ordinance has come in the small town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania.
15
the numbers [of illegal immigrants living in the country] range widely from about 7 million up to 20
million or more."); Julie Mason, Immigration Strategies Taking Shape, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 5, 2007,
at A9, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/masou/5189638.html
("Californians for Population Stabilization released a study claiming there are 20 million to 38 million
illegal immigrants in America, not the 12 million the federal government says.").
10. See Rick Lyman, New Data Shows Immigrants' Growth and Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2006, at Al (noting that the number of immigrants living in American households rose sixteen percent
between 2001 and 2006).
11. See Linda Kaiser Conley & Ilan Rosenberg, The Eye of The Storm, PA. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2007,
at 34, 35: Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Bill Dies in Senate, WASH. POST, June 29,2007, at A I ("The
most dramatic overhaul of the nation's immigration laws in a generation was crushed yesterday in the
Senate."); Yvonne M. Wenger, Could S.C. LeadRejorm?9, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct. 5,
2007, at IA (noting the rise of state legislation regarding immigration reform in the wake of failures for
national proposals).
12. See DIRK HEGEN, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007 ENACTED STATE
LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
immig/2007lmmigrationUpdate.htm ("In the continued absence of a comprehensive federal reform of
the United States' challenged immigration system, states have displayed an unprecedented level of
activity and have developed a variety of their own approaches and different solutions."). Another
national immigration policy group has noted, "In fewer than six months, over 90 U.S. local governments
have introduced, passed, or considered introduction of 105 ordinances that target hard-working
immigrants and their children." FAIR IMMIGRATION REFORM MOVEMENT, HISTORY OF THE PUSH FOR
LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES, http://fairimmigration.org/learn/immigration-reform-and-
immigrants/local-level/history.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008).
13. See Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralifing Immigration Policy, 84 DENY. U.
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2007) (categorizing the common types of local immigration ordinances as
"employment, day laborer, housing, and English-only").
14. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al (noting that many local immigration ordinances nationwide "have come
under legal assault" by the ACLU and immigration groups).
15. See Kristina M. Campbell, Local llegal Immigration ReliejAct Ordinances: A Legal, Policy,
andLitigationAnalysis, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2007) ("[T]he City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania
has gained the most notoriety for passing a local immigration restriction ordinance .... ). In addition
to Hazleton, litigation continues to headline the news in Valley Park, Missouri: Farmers Branch, Texas:
Riverside, New Jersey; and Escondido, California. See id at 1056 60 (summarizing the current
litigation over immigration ordinances in Escondido, Riverside, Valley Park, and Farmers Branch);
Karin Brulliard, Immigrant Laws Tread Uncharted Legal Path: With Local, Federal Powers Not Fully
Defined, Officials Look to the Courts, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at BI (noting the litigation taking
place in Valley Park and Farmers Branch).
[Vol. 59: 573
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Hazleton has taken center stage for two reasons. First, Hazleton passed several
ordinances that imposed fines on landlords who rented to illegal immigrants and
suspended business permits of employers who hired illegal immigrants. 6 These
ordinances became the model legislation for dozens of similar measures passed by
numerous local governments. 7 One such government is Beaufort County, South
Carolina, where in the wake of the collapse of her husband's business, Starletta
Hairston gathered local support for enacting tougher immigration regulations like
those in Hazleton. 8 Second, because of the archetypal nature of Hazleton's efforts,
the subsequent litigation regarding the legal validity of its ordinances has been
watched closely. On July 26, 2007, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania struck down Hazleton's ordinances. 9 Lozano was the first
opportunity for the federalj udiciary to contribute to the national conversation about
immigration reform, and many counties and municipalities clearly heard the district
court's opinion of the act that served as the model for local immigration initiatives
across the country.2 ° Lozano has sent a message that discourages local efforts to
regulate immigration.2 In the wake of the decision, many counties and
municipalities in South Carolina and across the country face the difficult decision
of either abandoning local immigration reforms or possibly defending the
ordinances in CoUrt.
2 2
This Note analyzes the court's decision in Lozano and compares the ordinances
in Hazleton and Beaufort County to determine whether Beaufort County's
ordinances would survive a constitutional challenge. Part 11 provides a brief
overview of the history and content of Hazleton's Illegal Immigration Relief Act,
followed by a short summary of the district court's opinion in Lozano regarding the
constitutionality of the Act. This summary focuses particularly on the issues of
preemption, due process, and equal protection. Part III examines the context and
content of the Beaufort County ordinance, which Starletta Hairston purposely
modeled after the Illegal Immigration Relief Act in Hazleton. Part IV further
analyzes the Lawful Employment Ordinance in Beaufort County by comparing its
language to the employment portion of Hazleton's Illegal Immigration Relief Act
to determine whether the Lawful Employment Ordinance would be upheld under
the constitutional analysis provided in Lozano. Part IV also argues that while the
Lawful Employment Ordinance may avoid a challenge on equal protection grounds,
16. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519, 530 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
17. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 40 ("More than 100 municipalities across the
country have adopted ordinances that are modeled after or are simply carbon copies of Hazleton's.").
18. See Terry Plumb, Impatience May Drive State, Local Laws, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Nov.
26, 2006, at I E (noting that Beaufort County's proposed ordinance is modeled partially after Hazleton's
measures).
19. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
20. See Belson, supra note 14 (noting that the repeal of a Riverside, New Jersey immigration
ordinance was influenced by the Lofano decision and that a representative of the Migration Policy
Institute predicted that "other towns would follow suit").
21. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 39 ("The [Lozano] opinion establishes clear
precedent that local ordinances designed to supplement or mimic federal immigration laws are not
tolerable under the Constitution.").
22. See Campbell, supra note 15, at 1046 (noting that citizens and taxpayers will ultimately bear
the costs of defending and enforcing local immigration ordinances).
20081
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it is susceptible to preemption and due process challenges. Part V concludes the
Note, examining the potential lasting impact of Lozano.
11. THE CITY OF HAZLETON'S ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT OF 2006 AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT AS
DECIDED IN LOZANO V. CITY OF HAZLETON
A. The City of Hazleton's Illegal Immigration ReliefAct of 2006
Like many small towns across the country, the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
had waited long enough for Congress to deal with the issue of illegal immigration.23
Motivated by the perceived burden on Hazleton's social services and the increased
criminal activity caused by increasing numbers of "illegal aliens,"24 the Hazleton
City Council adopted its first version of the Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance of 2006 (Original Ordinance) on July 13, 2006.25 The Original
Ordinance prohibited the employment of unlawful workers and the harboring of
undocumented aliens, and made English the official language of the city.
26
On August 15,2006,2 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), along with
the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (Puerto Rican Defense Fund),
filed an action against the City of Hazleton in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.28 The complaint sought to permanently enjoin
enforcement of the Original Ordinance and to have the Original Ordinance declared
23. See Conley& Rosenberg, supra note H, at 35 (noting that "public frustration with the federal
government's failure to enforce border control and to enact immigration reform legislation" led many
local governments to attempt to regulate immigration on their own); Carl Hulse & Rachel L. Swains,
G.O.P. Sets Aside Work on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,2006, at Al 8 ("Congressional Republican
leaders have all but abandoned a broad overhaul of immigration laws."); David Mclemore & Dianne
Solis, Cities Across U.S. Act on Immigration: Municipalities, Tired of Waiting on Congress, Get
Proactive on Reforms, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 16, 2007, at IA, available at
http://wwv.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/051607dnteximmigration.39f9
3fd.html (noting that the message to Congress from the multiple states and cities enacting immigration
legislation is the following: "If you can't do it, we will.").
24. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 35 (noting that the ordinances were strongly
supported by Hazleton's mayor, Louis Barletta, who "blam[ed] many of the city's criminal, economic
and social ills on 'illegal aliens').
25. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Original Ordinance],
available athttp://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf
26. See id. §§ 4-6. The Original Ordinance provided, "Any entity... that employs, retains, aids
or abets illegal aliens or illegal immigration into the United States ... shall ... be denied and barred
from approval of a business permit, renewal of a business permit, [and] any city contract or grant." Id.
§ 4. The Original Ordinance further prohibited illegal aliens "from leasing or renting property" and all
persons from knowingly allowing "an illegal alien to use, rent or lease their property." Id. § 5(A).
Finally, the Original Ordinance declared that English was the official language of the city, and that "all
official city business, forms, documents, [and] signage will be written in English only." Id. § 6(A). The
city also passed the Tenant Registration Ordinance (Registration Ordinance) on August 15, 2006, which
required apartment dwellers to obtain an "occupancy permit" from the City of Hazleton before leasing
their apartment. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007). To receive
an occupancy permit, the prospective tenants had to prove that they were legal citizens or lawful
residents. Id.
27. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
28. Complaint at 40, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06-
cv-01586-JMv\), 2006 WE 4385736.
[Vol. 59: 573
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unconstitutional.29 The court granted a temporary restraining order that prohibited
enforcement of the Original Ordinance and another ordinance, the Tenant
Registration Ordinance (Registration Ordinance),3" during which time Hazleton
passed an amended Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (IIRA).3' The I1RA
replaced the Original Ordinance, and the city council hoped that the amendments
would satisfy the detractors and encourage the ACLU to dismiss its lawsuit.3 2 The
amendment did neither. The Mayor of Hazleton announced that the city intended
to begin enforcing the IIRA on or after November 1, 2006;"3 the ACLU responded
by filing a second lawsuit.34
B. The Constitutional Challenges to the IIRA in Lozano v. City of Hazleton
The plaintiffs' second amended complaint in Lozano alleged a total of nine
causes of action,3" and the court's opinion addressed each of these causes of action
in a structured, methodical, and almost pedagogical manner. 6 The nine causes of
action can be separated into three main categories: (1) federal constitutional issues;
(2) federal statutory causes of action;37 and (3) state law causes of action.3 8 The
29. Id. at 3.
30. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
31. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http: //www.smalltownde fenders.com/090806/2006-18 %20 Illegal%20Alien%20Immigration%20
Reliefo20Act.pdf. Along with the 11RA, Hazleton also passed the Official English Ordinance (English
Ordinance). See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sep. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-19 /20 Official%20English.pdf. For a general
summary of the procedural history of Lozano in the initial stages of the lawsuit, see Campbell, supra
note 15, at 1042-45.
32. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
33. Eric L'Heureux Issadore, Note, Is Immigration Still Exclusively A Federal Power? A
Preemption Analysis on Legislation by Hazileton, Pennsylvania Regulating Illegal Immigration, 52
VILL. L. REV. 331, 335 (2007).
34. Id. at 335-36. Just prior to the trial, Hazleton again amended the IIRA by adding a section
covering "Implementation and Process." See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.prldeforg/Civil/Hazelton/hazleton /201egal /20documents/2006-40 /20
llRA201mplementation%20Amendment_.pdf.
35. Second Amended Complaint at 29, 39, 43, 46-48, 53, 56, 60, Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477
(No. 3:06-cv-01586-JVM).
36. As noted by the court, at issue in the case were only the IIRA and the Registration Ordinance.
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485. The plaintiffs alleged that the city had used the "litigation as its
learning curve," as the city council continued to amend the I IRA in response to the lawsuits filed by the
ACLU. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 3. However, the court focused its analysis
only on the IIRA as it existed at the time of trial rather than on all of the variations of the IIRA. See
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 516 ("[O]ur duty is to address [the] IIRA as it now stands."). The version
of the IIRA examined by the court was Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinance 2006-40, and
Ordinance 2007-6, which the court referred to collectively as the "IIRA" or "Ordinance" throughout
the opinion. Id. at 485 n.3. The court did not examine the English Ordinance.
37. The fourth and fifth causes of action alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (2000), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 46-47.
38. The sixth cause of action alleged that the IIRA's employment provisions violated
Pennsylvania's municipality law. Id. at 48. Count seven alleged that the Registration Ordinance violated
the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.101 (1994). Id. at 53.
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court focused most of its efforts on the constitutional critique of the employment
provisions of the IJRA. 9
Because the analysis of the constitutional issues are most pertinent to the
examination of the Beaufort County ordinance, this Note limits its examination to
the three main federal constitutional issues addressed in Lozano.40 First, the
plaintiffs alleged that federal law preempted the IIRA under the Supremacy
Clause.4' Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the IIRA violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to guarantee those affected a "right
to a hearing prior to the deprivation of substantive rights."42 Finally, the plaintiffs
averred violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the IIRA "use[d] race and national origin as an overt classification."43
1. Preemption of the JIRA Under Federal Immigration Law
a. Express Preemption
The Lozano court laid the foundation for its preemption discussion by noting
that "[t]he Supremacy clause ofthe United States Constitution invalidates state laws
39. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518-29, 533-37.
40. The final version of Beaufort County's Lawful Employment Ordinance models only the
employment provisions of the IIRA and does not include the harboring or English-only provisions. See
BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69 (2007). In Lozano, the court analyzed the employment
provisions of the IIRA primarily in the federal constitutional-issues portion of the opinion. See Lozano,
496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 29, 533 37. The court's examination of the federal statutory causes of action
and the state law causes of action both dealt with issues related to the Registration Ordinance. See id.
at 545-54. This Note focuses primarily on the constitutional issues, because the constitutional analysis
of the Hazleton ordinances is most significant in analyzing the viability of the Beaufort County
ordinance. Although the plaintiffs did raise a fourth constitutional argument that the IIRA and
Registration Ordinance's requirements to provide personal identity information was a violation of the
Constitution's right to protection of certain zones ofprivacy-the court's examination dealt mostly with
the Registration Ordinance and ultimately held that the documents required under the IIRA were not
sufficiently defined to render judgment on whether they violated a right to privacy. See id. at 544 45.
41. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 29 39. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued,
The Supremacy Clause mandates that Federal law preempts any state
regulation of any area over which Congress has expressly or impliedly exercised
exclusive authority or which is constitutionally reserved to the Federal
government.
The [IIRA] and the . .. Registration Ordinance usurp the Federal
government's exclusive power over immigration and naturalization and its power
to regulate foreign affairs.
Id. at 30.
42. Id. at 39.
43. Jd. at 45.
[Vol. 59: 573
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that interfere with or are contrary to federal law."44 This invalidation of state law,
otherwise known as preemption, "can be either express or implied."45
The examination of whether the IIRA is expressly preempted begins with
federal law. The main federal statute under which the plaintiffs brought their
preemption challenge is the Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986
(IRCA).46 IRCA prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized aliens who are not
permanent residents of the United States or who are not lawfully authorized to work
in the United States.47 IRCA creates safeguards to help businesses ensure that no
unauthorized workers are employed. One such safeguard requires employers to
verify the identity of a new employee, usually through the review of certain
documentation provided by the employee.48 These documents are listed on the
Employee Eligibility Verification Form (1-9 Form) which is distributed by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.4 9 The employer must inspect
and attest to the required documentation when hiring an employee." IRCA further
requires that an employer who unknowingly hired an unauthorized alien-or an
44. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d. at 518 (quoting N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of W. N.Y., 299 F.3d
235 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Before discussing the preemption question, the
court first assessed each of the plaintiffs' constitutional standing and concluded that the named
plaintiffs, the organizational plaintiffs, and the anonymous plaintiffs-with the exception of two
business owners (whose claims lacked redressability)-all had standing. See id. at 491, 504. The city
challenged the plaintiffs' prudential standing under the "zone of interests" test articulated by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. at 499 500 (citing Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir.
2003)). The city argued that "because the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was not designed to
protect employers who unlawfully employ[] illegal aliens and landlords who harbor illegal aliens," the
plaintiffs who were unlawfully employing or harboring illegal aliens had no standing to raise a
challenge based on federal immigration laws. See id. at 500 01 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court rejected this argument, however, and found that the plaintiffs' grievances did "arguably fall within
the zone of interests of the statutes at the center of this lawsuit." Id. at 502. Specifically, the court noted
the following:
Plaintiffs do not claim that the application or interpretation of a law by some state
or local agency to which they have no connection is inappropriate but instead
claim that their legal rights are violated by a legislative enactment aimed directly
at the operation of their businesses or their ability to work or rent property in the
City of Hazleton.
Id.
In what is perhaps the most strongly worded portion of the opinion, the district court responded
to the city's argument that the tenant plaintiffs lacked standing "because they [did] not have
authorization to reside in the United States and [had] not suffered an injury for which they could gain
relief." Id. at 498. The court characterized this reasoning as a "species of argument often heard in recent
discussions of the national immigration issue." Id. The court responded to this argument by stating that
the "Supreme Court has consistently interpreted [the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] to
apply to all people present in the United States, whether they were born here, immigrated here through
legal means, or violated federal l aw to enter the country." Id. at 498-99. The court stated unequivocally,
"We cannot say clearly enough that persons who enter this country without legal authorization are not
stripped immediately of all their rights because of this single illegal act." Id. at 498.
45. Id. at 518 (citing Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, I F.3d 202, 216 (3d Cir. 1993)).
46. See id For the court's discussion of the history of IRCA entitled "History of Immigration
Regulation in America," see Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d app. at 556-62.
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (h)(3) (2000).
48. See id. § 1324a(b)(l); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2007) (discussing the verification form that
employers are to use during the verification process).
49. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2).
50. See id. § 274a.2(a)(3).
20081
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individual who became unauthorized subsequent to hiring must discharge the
employee immediately upon discovery of the employee's status.5' An employee
who provides fraudulent documents can be subject to harsh fines,52 and the same
applies to the employer who violates these provisions.53
Central to the City of Hazleton' s claim that the IIRA was a valid ordinance was
the preemption clause contained in IRCA, which provides the following: "The
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ,
or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." 54 The city argued
that in drafting its ordinances it had used "exacting precision" in following IRCA's
preemption clause and "eschewed the imposition of criminal or civil penalties,"
instead taking "those actions expressly permitted by Congress. 5 In particular,
Hazleton avoided the use of criminal or civil sanctions but seized Congress's
implied invitation to create local enforcement provisions-such as the suspension
of business permits for businesses that employ an unauthorized alien. 56 The city
argued that such measures fall squarely within the "licensing and similar laws"
exception to IRCA's preemption clause. 7
The court rejected this interpretation completely. The court reasoned that
suspending a business permit would be the "ultimate sanction," and "[i]t would not
make sense for Congress in limiting the state's authority to allow states and
municipalities the opportunity to provide the ultimate sanction, but no lesser
penalty." 8 In reaching its decision, the court relied in part on legislative history,
referencing a report from the House Committee on the Judiciary.5 9 The report,
which examined the preemption clause of IRCA, led the court to conclude, "The
'licensing' that the statute discusses refers to revoking a local license for a violation
of the federal IRCA sanction provisions, as opposed to revoking a business license
for violation of local laws."6 In other words, IRCA's "express pre-emption clause
applies generally, except for state or local laws dealing with suspension, revocation
or refusal to reissue a license to an entity found to have violated the sanction
provisions of the IRCA.'
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2).
52. See id § 1324c(d)(3).
53. See id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A), (f)(1).
54. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
55. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
56. See id.
57. Id.; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) at 42, Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (No. 3:06-cv-01586-JMM) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law], 2006 WL 4286242 ("Congress clearly left open a doorway for state and local
legislation on the subject-in the form of sanctions ... through licensing and similar laws." (internal
quotations marks omitted)).
58. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
59. See id. at 519 20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662).
60. Id. at 519.
61. Id. at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 59: 573
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b. Implied Preemption: Field and Conflict Preemption
The court also examined the IIRA in light of implied preemption, discussing
in turn the two common forms of implied preemption field preemption and
conflict preemption.62 In finding that IRCA impliedly preempted the IIRA, the court
stated that "[t]he federal government possesses an especially strong interest in
immigration matters" and that "the individual states, or municipalities located in
those states, do not."63 From the court's perspective, the pervasiveness of federal
law governing the employment of illegal aliens clearly illustrates that "IRCA is a
comprehensive scheme" that "leaves no room for state regulation."64 In other
words, "any additions added by local governments would be either in conflict with
the law or a duplication of its terms-the very definition of field pre-emption."65 As
if speaking directly to any state or municipality considering similar ordinances, the
court emphatically declared, "Immigration is a national issue. 66
The court also considered conflict preemption-whether the Hazleton
ordinance conflicted with federal law in such a way that it either (1) stood "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress" or (2) made it impossible for a party to comply with both the Hazleton
ordinance and federal law.67 Comparing the Hazleton ordinance with IRCA, the
court found that "under federal law, the employer has the responsibility to review
the documents," while under the Hazleton ordinance, "the employer [would have
been] required to present the documents to the [Hazleton] Code Enforcement
Office, which contacts the federal government to determine the status of the
worker."68 Accordingly, the court held that the ordinance conflicted with federal
law.69
Generally, the burden of examining the verification documents to determine an
employee's identity, residency status, and employment eligibility falls on the
employer."y However, the Hazleton ordinance required an employee to provide to
the employer "identification papers," which the employer would have then
delivered to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office (CEO). y' The CEO would in
turn have contacted the federal government to verify the employment eligibility of
the potential worker. y2 Furthermore, the IIRA required participation in the newly
created Basic Pilot Program in certain circumstances, 3 while IRCA makes
62. See id. at 521 29.
63. Id. at 522.
64. Id. at 523.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 523. The court continued, "The United States Congress has provided complete and
thorough regulations with regard to the employment of unauthorized aliens including anti-immigration
discrimination provisions. Allowing States or local governments to legislate with regard to the
employment of unauthorized aliens would interfere with Congressional objectives." Id. at 523 24.
67. Id. at 525 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. at 526.
69. See id.
70. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) (2007).
71. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d. at 526.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 526 27.
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participation in the Basic Pilot Program optional. In so doing, the Hazleton
ordinance "supplement[ed] the requirements of federal law.",7' Because "the federal
government.., has enacted a complete scheme of regulation on the subject on the
employment of unauthorized aliens," the court declared, "Hazleton cannot conflict,
interfere, curtail or complement this law.",76 The court found that the I1RA did just
that and was therefore preempted.7
There are two important sidenotes to the court's preemption discussion. First,
the city relied heavily on the seminal Supreme Court decision on immigration, De
Canas v. Bica,78 which dealt with the constitutionality of a California statute
regulating the employment of unauthorized alien residents. 79 The California statute
at issue in De Canas penalized any employer who "knowingly employ[ed] an alien
who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment
would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers." 80
The City of Hazleton relied on De Canas for the proposition that "[n]ot every
state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration
and thus per se pre-empted."'' Further, the De Canas Court defined "regulation of
immigration" as "essentially a determination of who should or should not be
74. According to the court, "The Basic Pilot Program is a voluntary, experimental program created
by Congress to permit employers to electronically verify workers' employment eligibility with the U.S.
Dep. of Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a notes)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 526.
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id. In addition to the conflict in employment verification requirements, several other conflicts
existed between the Hazleton ordinance and federal regulations. First, while federal law excludes from
employer verification certain classes of workers, the IIRA had no such exclusions. See Lozano, 469 F.
Supp. 2d at 526 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 2741 a. 1 (2007)). Second, the I IRA created a private cause of action
against employers, while IRCA does not. Under the IIRA, if a business discharged an employee who
was not "unlawful" while simultaneously employing a worker who was unlawful, the discharged
employee could bring a private cause of action against the business for "unfair business practice." See
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(E)(2)(a) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalitowndefenders.com/090806/2006-18 / 20_lllegal / 20Alien / 201mmigration / 20
Relie o20Act.pdf. The discharged employee could seek treble damages, attorney's fees, and the costs
of the suit. See id. In addition to supplementing federal law, this private right of action was in direct
opposition to settled state law in Pennsylvania. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 549-50 (noting that the
private right of action disrupts well-settled principles of Pennsylvania's at-will employment doctrine).
Third, the IRA required suspension of the business permit of any business entity that did not correct
a violation-failure to provide proper identity data within three days of the CEO's notification, and
there was no right to appeal the CEO's findings. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(4).
IRCA, on the other hand, allows an employer to appeal any finding by the Basic Pilot Program of
nonconformance within eight days, after which the federal immigration officials and the Social Security
Administration have ten days to respond. See Pilot Programs for Employment Eligibility Confirmation,
62 Fed. Reg. 48,309, 48,312 (Sept. 15, 1997). During that time, the employer is prohibited from taking
any adverse action against the employee in question-including termination. Id. Finally, while IRCA
prohibits employment discrimination against legally-admitted immigrants, the IIRA did not have any
antidiscriminatory provisions. For IRCA's prohibition on employment discrimination, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(1) (2000).
78. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
79. See id. at 352 53.
80. Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (1971) (repealed 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss3/9
IMMIGRATION LAW
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain. 82 The city argued that because the IIRA did not attempt to decide which
aliens should or should not be admitted, the ordinance should not be preempted.83
The court distinguished De Canas from Hazleton, however, suggesting that the
difference lay in the fact that De Canas was decided pre-IRCA.84 Under the old
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), the principle aim was to regulate the
immigration and naturalization of illegal aliens.85 The employment of illegal aliens
had not been of primary concern under the INA.86 Between De Canas and Lozano,
however, Congress enacted IRCA, which has the clear purpose of regulating the
employment of unauthorized aliens.8  According to the court, IRCA's
comprehensive scheme "occupies the field to the exclusion of State or local laws."88
Therefore, the court held that Hazleton's ordinances were preempted.89
The second important sidenote to the preemption discussion is the court's
concern for the policy that underlies its determination that immigration is a national
issue. In addition to "border enforcement"-preventing entry of unauthorized
persons federal law is also concerned with "interior enforcement"
"distinguishing between legal and undocumented immigrants already in the
country and removing the latter."9 Critical to interior enforcement is "a balance
between finding and removing undocumented immigrants without accidentally
removing immigrants and legal citizens, all without imposing too much of a burden
on employers and workers."'" The court noted that the results of this balancing act
directly affect United States foreign relations.9 2 The court explained that the strong
ramifications for national policy are precisely why "the United States political
system places the responsibility for striking this balance with the United States
Congress and the executive branch."93 One problem with Hazleton's ordinances,
according to the court, was the failure of the ordinances to consider effects beyond
Hazleton's local concerns.94
2. The JIRA and Due Process
The Lozano plaintiffs' second constitutional cause of action alleged that the
IIRA employment provisions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.95 The issue before the court was twofold: first, whether the Due
82. Id. (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 57, at 53 ("The City of Hazleton does not attempt to
ascertain any alien's status, whether that status be easy to determine or difficult. Hazleton relies entirely
upon the answer provided by federal officials.").
84. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
85. See id. at 524 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359).
86. See id. (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359).
87. See id.
88. Id. at 523.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 527.
91. Id. at 527-28.
92. Id. at 528.
93. Id.
94. See id. (noting that Hazleton's mayor and the city council were concerned only with Hazleton
and "did not consider the implications of the ordinances on foreign policy").
95. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 39 43.
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Process Clause protects the interests involved; and second, whether the procedures
created in the IIRA provided adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard.96
The Hazleton ordinances regulating employment affected the interests of at
least two classes of people Hazleton employers, and both current and potential
employees. As to the employers, the court noted that "[a] business is an established
property right entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 7 As to the
employees, the court cited the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that "the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." 98 In addition, the court noted that the "Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent."9 9 Therefore, the court found no difficulty in concluding
that the Due Process Clause was applicable to the interests of both the employers
and employees before the court.100
The court next had to determine whether the Hazleton ordinances created a
process that adequately protected the interests discussed above, and whether that
process included adequate notice for both employers and employees.' Upon close
examination of the process, the court found that the employment provisions of the
ordinances failed to properly notify an employee when a complaint was filed
regarding that employee's eligibility." 2 Because the IIRA did not require an
employee to be notified in such a situation, nothing within the IIRA's process
prevented an employer from simply choosing to terminate the worker's
employment rather than taking the requisite steps to verify the employee's
eligibility status. 1 3 Thus, the IIRA contained no procedural protection for an
employee in this situation." 4 In addition, the court found the IIRA lacking in its
failure to define "identity information" and in its failure to provide the employee
with an opportunity to request a second or additional verification.1
5
3. The IIRA and Equal Protection
The third constitutional claim the plaintiffs brought in Lozano alleged that the
I1RA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'06 The
96. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34.
97. Id. at 533 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d
353, 361 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 534 (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. (quoting Kamara v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 216 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100. See id.
101. See id. The court also analyzed the Registration Ordinance and the landlord tenant
regulations in the IIRA under the Due Process Clause. Id. Because the focus of this Note is on the
employment related provisions of the IIRA, it will not discuss the due process concerns of the
Registration Ordinance.




106. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 43-46.
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crux of the plaintiffs' argument centered on the language of the IRA regarding
complaints.' The plaintiffs contended that such a policy, which allowed the city
to consider race, ethnicity, or national origin when determining whether a complaint
was valid, implicated a discriminatory intent by default; 10 8 although a complaint
could not be based exclusively or primarily on suspect classifications, such
classifications could play a lesser role in filing a complaint.0 9 The city council
eventually amended the lIRA, 1"° which the plaintiffs argued was done "in an effort
to simplify this issue and remove the equal protection challenge from the case."'
' I
The amended version removed the phrase "solely or primarily," thereby also
removing from the city the responsibility of determining the validity of a complaint
based on suspect classifications.2
Unlike the first two constitutional challenges, the court was not persuaded by
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim." 3 The most recent version of the IRA had
effectively accomplished its objective by amending away any provisions
susceptible to an equal protection claim." 4 As a result, the plaintiffs changed gears
in their equal protection challenge; rather than focusing on the actual language of
the lIRA, they instead challenged the intent behind the legislation."' The court
responded to this tactical move by noting that, in order to show that a facially
neutral ordinance was intentionally discriminatory, the plaintiffs "must show that
the relevant decisionmaker ... adopted the policy at issue because of, not merely
in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.""'6 The court held that
because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the lIRA was passed with a
discriminatory intent, they did not prove a necessary element for their equal
protection challenge of a facially neutral policy." 7
107. See id. The relevant portion of the JIRA stated, "A complaint which alleges a violation solely
or primarily on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not be
enforced." Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(2) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-18 / 20-Illegal / 2OAlien / 201mmigration / 20
Reliefto20Act.pdf
108. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at 44-45.
109. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
110. See id. As with the other portions of the ordinance that were amended after this litigation was
commenced, the court determined that it would evaluate only the latest version of the ordinances rather
than ruling on the validity of a law that was no longer in existence. See supra note 36.
111. Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 541.
114. See id. at 539 ("Hazleton's trial counsel argued that the City had made this change 'in an
effort to simplify this issue and remove the equal protection challenge' from the case.").
115. See id. at 540 ("[Plaintiffs] have apparently shifted their emphasis from a focus on the
language of the policy itself to an inquiry into the defendant's intent in amending [the] IRA.").
116. Id. (quoting Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.; see also Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[E]ven ifa neutral
law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a... minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose."); Antonelli v. New
Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[The Equal Protection Clause] prohibits states from
intentionally discriminating between individuals on the basis of race." (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 642 (1993))). The plaintiffs offered the testimony of an immigration expert as proof of the
discriminatory effect of the IIRA and testimony of Hazleton's mayor, as well as evidence of the city
council's actions as proof of the discriminatory intent. See Lofano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41. The
court was not persuaded by the evidence. See id. at 541.
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In summary, the court held that federal law preempted the IJRA"' and that the
I1RA violated the Due Process Clause by failing to provide adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard." 9 However, the court concluded that the IIRA did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause on its face. 20
III. BEAUFORT COUNTY'S LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT ORDINANCE
A. Growth of Immigration in Beaufort County
In recent years, the number of immigrants migrating to Beaufort County has
increased the Latino population in Hilton Head from one percent of the population
in 1995 to approximately fifteen percent in 2006-a significant increase for a small
town of 34,000.121 Most of the immigrants are Mexican, and many are attracted to
the resort city because of the numerous jobs in construction and hospitality.
12
Blaming the inaction of Congress for the large influx of illegal immigrants and
citing strains on the local schools, healthcare systems, andjob market, 23 the County
Council of Beaufort County decided to take matters into its own hands. In
December 2006, the council approved the Lawful Employment Ordinance (LEO). 1
24
LEO, which passed by a vote of 9_0,125 was the product of several revisions and
changed significantly from the version originally proposed by council member
Starletta Hairston. 126 In its original form, Beaufort County's ordinance was modeled
after the City of Hazleton's Illegal Immigration Relief Act' and included identical
sections such as the "harboring" provision contained in Hazleton's IIRA. 28
However, the version that the county council eventually passed removed several of
these provisions, and the final version of LEO deals primarily with the employment
of unauthorized aliens.
129
118. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 521, 529, 533.
119. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 537 38.
120. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
121. See Jordan, supra note 4.
122. Id.
123. See Noelle Phillips, S.C. Watches as Beaufort County Struggles with Immigration Issues,
STATE, Dec. 10, 2006, at Al (noting that supporters of the ordinance believe the county must act
"because the federal government has failed to act" and because "illegal immigrants put a strain on
community school and health care systems and take jobs from locals").
124. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69 (2007); Jeremy Hsieh, County CouncilPasses
Lawful Employment Ordinance. Incoming Council Members Critici e Last-Minute Approval,
BEAUFORT GAZETTE (S.C.), Dec. 28, 2006, at IA.
125. See Hsieh, supra note 124.
126. See Jeremy Hsieh, Federal Judge Strikes Down Law on Illegal hnmigration, BEAUFORT
GAZETTE (S.C.), July 27,2007, at IA (noting that the Beaufort County Council passed a"watered-down
version" of the original ordinance, which had been "modeled closely after Hazleton's").
127. See id
128. See Beaufort County, S.C., Ordinance 2006/31 (Proposed Third Draft 2006),
http://www.bcgov.net/council/ordinances/REVISED / 2 0BUSINESS 2 0LICENSE /200RDINANCE
%20AND% 20UNLAWFUL% /20WORKER% 20PROGRAM% 20DRAFT3% 201023060 20sdb.pdf.
129. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69.
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B. The Lawful Employment Ordinance
Beaufort County enacted LEO to prohibit the hiring of "any person who is an
unauthorized alien for employment in the United States."' 30 Any person or business
applying for a license in Beaufort County must file a form with the county
declaring, under penalty of perjury, that such person or business "does not
knowingly utilize the services of, engage or hire any person who is an unauthorized
alien."'' The County of Beaufort Business License Division (License Division) is
authorized to enforce the requirements of LEO by commencing an investigation of
a business "if an inspection or audit performed pursuant to Beaufort County
Ordinance [Code] section 18-57 shows that the licensee does not meet the
documentation requirements contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a for persons employed
in Beaufort County."' 3 2 Once an investigation is commenced, the licensee is given
three days to produce certain employment verification documents.'33 If the licensee
fails to produce the required documentation, an enforcement action is
commenced.' 34 The License Division is required to give proper notice to the
licensee upon commencement of an enforcement action.'3 5 The licensee may have
as many as sixty days to provide additional information that would support the
allegedly unauthorized alien's actual authorization to work in the United States.
13 6
During this time, "the licensee's business license shall remain unaltered."' 3 7 Only
where "the licensee fails to provide additional documentation or [where] the license
inspector finds the additional documentation does not meet the requirements of 8
U.S.C. § 1324a" will the county suspend the licensee's business license.'38 Finally,
appeals of the License Division's decision can be made to the county council.' 3 9
IV. BEAUFORT COUNTY VERSUS HAZLETON: APPLYING THE ANALYSIS OF LOZANO
V. CITY OF HAZLETON TO BEAUFORT COUNTY'S LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT
ORDINANCE
The decision in Lozano provided "a glaring red stop light" to counties and
municipalities across the country on the road to addressing the problem of illegal
immigration.4° According to senior counsel for the Puerto Rican Defense Fund, the
Lozano opinion is a "bulletproof decision" that is "meticulous, careful and well
130. See id. As used throughout the ordinance, "unauthorized alien" is defined by the same as in
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2000). See id § 18-69(1)(a)(7) ("The county shall not conclude that a person
is an unauthorized alien unless and until an authorized representative of the county has verified with
the federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, subsection 1373(c), the person's
authorization to work.").
131. Id. § 18-69(2)(a)(2).
132. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(1).
133. Id. The verification documents are defined in 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) (2007).
134. BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3)(b)(2).
135. Id. § 18-69(3)(c)(1).
136. See id. § 18-69(3)(d)(2).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 18-69(3)(e)(1).
139. See id. § 18-69(3)(f).
140. Julia Preston, Judge Voids Ordinances on Illegal Inmigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007,
at A14 (quoting the lead ACLU lawyer in Lofano as saying that "[t]his opinion should be a glaring red
stop light for any local officials thinking about passing similar laws").
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thought out," and is "devastating to towns, be it Beaufort or Hazleton.'' 4. Is the
Beaufort County LEO similar enough to Hazleton's IIRA to be susceptible to the
legal analysis of Lozano or can Beaufort County's watered-down version survive
judicial scrutiny? To answer that question, one must examine LEO in light of the
three constitutional challenges the Lozano court examined regarding the IIRA. 42
A. The Lawful Employment Ordinance and Preemption
The Beaufort County ordinance is most susceptible to a constitutional
challenge under Lozano's preemption analysis because LEO is probably impliedly
preempted under both field and conflict preemption. First, any justification for
Beaufort County's decision to wade into the waters controlled by federal
immigration regulation likely would be grounded in the express preemption clause
contained in IRCA.'43 Though Beaufort County takes a much different route than
Hazleton in regulating and enforcing its ordinance, the destination is ultimately the
same: failure to correct the violation will result in the suspension of the business
license or permit. 44 Because this is the type of ultimate sanction decried by the
Lozano court,'4 5 LEO could be challenged as being expressly preempted by IRCA.
Notably, inj ust a few sentences, Lozano essentially disposes of what is perhaps
the most important part of the defense offered by the City of Hazleton on behalf of
its would-be immigration reforms-that local laws regulating the employment of
unauthorized aliens are expressly permitted as "licensing and similar laws" under
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 146 The Lozano court distinguished the type of license
141. Hsieh, supra note 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See discussion supra Part II.B.
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000); supra text accompanying notes 46-61 (discussing the
Lozano court's application of IRCA's preemption clause to the Hazleton ordinance).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 56 57, 132 38.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 58 61.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. Possibly, the Lozano court interpreted the
preemption clause too narrowly. Under the IIRA, there were no civil or criminal sanctions, and the
suspension of a business permit was not permanent but lasted only until the violation was corrected. See
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(6) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-18 / 20_lllegal / 20Alien / 201mmigration / 20
Reliefo20Act.pdf. LEO is even more forgiving in the initial enforcement action than was the IIRA, and
the License Division may not suspend a license under LEO unless a licensee fails or refuses to provide
the necessary documentation within a period of up to sixty days. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE
§ 18-69(3) (2007). The licensee is allowed three days "to produce employment verification documents"
after an investigation commences. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(1). Once a licensee receives notice of an
enforcement action, the licensee can submit additional documentation to the License Division within
fifteen days, with a possible forty-five day extension. Id. § 18-69(3)(d)(2). Throughout this entire
period, "the licensee's business license shall remain unaltered." Id. Despite the Lozano court's
assumption that the city would wield the power of permit suspension in such a way that it would "force
the employer out of business," Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519 (M.D. Pa. 2007),
the permit suspension in both ordinances was and is only a temporary measure and one that arguably
fits the violation. If a business breaks the law, it loses its right to operate with a permit. However, if the
business corrects the problem, it can be legally recognized once again. The Lozano court reasoned, "It
would not make sense for Congress in limiting the state's authority to allow states and municipalities
the opportunity to provide the ultimate sanction, but no lesser penalty. Such an interpretation renders
the express preemption clause [of IRCA] nearly meaningless." Id. Yet, to classify even a temporary
suspension of a business license as the "ultimate sanction" significantly reduces the amount of
regulation a local municipality can actually accomplish through the "licensing and similar laws"
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suspension allowed under IRCA from the suspension created by the lIRA, stating
the following: "Hazleton suspends the business permit of those who violate its
Ordinance, not those who violate the IRCA. Thus, the licensing exception to State
and local pre-emption is not applicable."' 4 Whether the court's semantic sidestep
withstands appellate scrutiny remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Lozano now stands
for the proposition that any regulation that results in the "ultimate sanction" will
necessarily be preempted by IRCA. 48
Second, under the conflict preemption analysis discussed above,'49 the federal
government's scheme of regulation regarding the employment of unauthorized
aliens means that Beaufort County could not enact any legislation that "conflict[s],
interfere[s], curtail[s] or complement[s] this law."'15 LEO avoids the conflict
problems of the JIRA in several ways. First, although the language in both
ordinances is similar regarding employment,'' Beaufort County specifically ties
its prohibition against employing unauthorized aliens to IRCA. 12 Thus, rather than
adding to federal law, Beaufort County has merely reiterated it. Second, LEO
specifically prohibits a licensee from "knowingly" employing an unauthorized
alien. "'53 The IIRA originally lacked a provision regarding the element of
knowledge, which IRCA specifically required, and the court indicated that the
failure to include this element would constitute a conflict with federal law.1 4 Third,
the court criticized the IIRA for its mandatory requirement that all employers
participate in the Basic Pilot Program, because IRCA does not mandate
participation in the Basic Pilot Program.' Beaufort County avoided this pitfall by
removing the Basic Pilot Program provision entirely from its final version of LEO.
Finally, the IIRA ran afoul of federal regulations by failing to include any
antidiscrimination provisions in the ordinance." 6 In contrast, LEO requires that
employers "treat all employees uniformly when completing employment eligibility
verification documents" and prohibits employers from setting "different
exception to IRCA's preemption clause, effectively rendering the exception meaningless.
147. Lofano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520. While this same argument could be applied to LEO, the
structure of LEO that ties its documentation requirements directly to I RCA means that a business could
only violate the ordinance by violating IRCA itself See infra text accompanying note 166.
148. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
149. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
150. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
151. Compare Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(A) ("It is unlawful for any business entity
to recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, orto permit, dispatch, or instruct any person who
is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or part within the City."), with BEAUFORT COUNTY,
S.C., CODE § 18-69(2)(a)(1) ("Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, it is unlawful for a person or other entity
to recruit, hire, or continue to hire any person who is an unauthorized alien for employment in the
United States.").
152. BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(2)(a)(1).
153. See id. § 18-69(2)(a)(2). Specifically, LEO provides,
Every business or person that applies for a business license to engage in any type
of work in the county shall attest under penalty of perjury, on a form designated
by the county, that the licensee does not knowingly utilize the services of, engage
or hire any person who is an unauthorized alien.
Id.
154. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
155. Id. at 526-27.
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employment eligibility verification standards for different groups of employees."' 57
LEO also provides that "[a]n allegation of discrimination may be filed by an
individual who believes he or she is the victim of employment discrimination by
contacting the appropriate state and federal agencies.'' 58
However, although LEO avoids many of the conflicts that the IIRA contained,
LEO shares at least one problem with the IIRA that could ultimately result in
preemption. Both ordinances require a city or county department in Hazleton, the
CEO, and in Beaufort County, the License Division to collect and review the
applicable identification documents to verify the eligibility of the suspected
worker. 5 9 UnderLozano's analysis, the intermediary review position ofthe License
Division, like the CEO in Hazleton, arguably supplements federal law and could
therefore be impliedly preempted. 60
B. The Lawful Employment Ordinance and Due Process
Although the Beaufort County LEO probably provides adequate notice to
employers against whom an enforcement action has been commenced, 6' it may be
susceptible to a due process challenge because it fails to provide adequate notice
to any employee against whom action is being taken. In addition, the hearing and
appeal process available to employers and employees under LEO likely will not
withstand judicial scrutiny.'62
157. BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(2)(b)(2). LEO ties this employment discrimination
prohibition to federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination such as the Federal Immigration and
Nationality Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -110 (2005), and the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -170 (1976 & Supp. 2007). See id. § 18-69(2)(b)(1).
158. Id. § 18-69(2)(b)(3). In the context of the previous antidiscrimination provisions, this
provision clearly would apply to a situation where an employer had set different employment eligibility
verification standards for different employees in violation of section 18-69(2)(b)(2). However, section
18-69(2)(b)(3) seems equally applicable to the situation anticipated by the Lozano court, where an
employer decides to discharge an allegedly unauthorized employee to avoid the difficulty of
determining the immigration status of the employee. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
159. Compare BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3)(b)(2) (noting that an enforcement
action begins if "the licensee fails to produce the required documentation to the business license
division"), with Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(3) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smaltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-18 / 20_lllegal / 20Alien / 201mmigration / 20
Reliefto20Act.pdf ("[T]he Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall ... request identity information
from the business entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful workers."). This review process
is discussed further under the due process analysis below.
160. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526. The court stated,
The primary conflict in this area is that under federal law, the employer has the
responsibility to review the documents, and in the Hazleton Ordinance, the
employer is required to present the documents to the Code Enforcement Office,
which contacts the federal government to determine the status of the worker. The
Hazleton Ordinance, therefore, supplements the requirements of federal law.
Id. The Lozano court also found that the IIRA conflicted with federal law by failing to exempt certain
employees from verification requirements-something I RCA requires. See id. (noting that independent
contractors and casual domestic workers are excluded from federal verification requirements and that
the "IIRA contains no such exclusions" (citing 8 C.F.R. § 2741a.1 (2007))). LEO likewise fails to
exempt such workers from immigration status verification. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-
69.
161. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3).
162. See id. § 18-69(3)(t).
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The most notable difference between LEO and the IIRA is the method of
enforcement prescribed by each ordinance. Under the Hazleton IIRA, enforcement
was "initiated by means of a written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office."' 63 The complaint could be initiated by any person or entity,
and a valid complaint only needed to "include an allegation which describes the
alleged violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date and
location where such actions occurred.' 64
Beaufort County employs a much different enforcement system. Section 18-57
of the Beaufort County Code of Ordinances authorizes "the license inspector or
other authorized agent of the county" to inspect, examine, and audit the records of
businesses within the county to ensure compliance with the county's business and
professional licenses requirements.165 Under LEO, an investigation is commenced
"if an inspection or audit [performed by the county] shows that the licensee does
not meet the documentation requirements contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a for persons
employed in Beaufort County.' 66 Only where the licensee does not produce the
necessary documentation will the License Division commence an enforcement
action.
67
The death knell for the IIRA under Lozano's due process analysis was the
ordinance's failure to provide adequate notice. 168 As the court noted, "notice is the
cornerstone of due process," and the IIRA did not provide adequate notice either
to employers or employees.' 69 The IIRA required the Hazleton CEO to request
"identity information" from an employer regarding "any persons alleged to be
unlawful workers.' 17' The court found a problem with this provision, in that the
ordinance did not "specify the nature of this information" or allow employees to
request "verification" in this regard.'7 ' From the court's perspective, this left
employers unsure of what documents were needed for the "hearing"; thus, the IIRA
ran afoul of due process.
172
LEO, by contrast, specifically connects its documentation requirements with
the federal requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 7 3 Under LEO, an investigation
is commenced only if an inspection shows that those federally-prescribed
documentation requirements are not met. 17 4 Moreover, section 18-69(3)(d)(1)
permits the licensee to submit "additional documentation" to the License Division
"to support that the alleged unauthorized alien is authorized to work in the United
States.'75 While "additional documentation" is no more specific than "identity
information," a reasonable reading of the ordinance suggests that the additional
163. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § (4)(B)(1).
164. Id.
165. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-57.
166. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(1).
167. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(2).
168. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
169. Id.
170. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(3) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-18 / 20_lllegal / 20Alien / 201mmigration / 20
Reliefo20Act.pdf
171. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
172. See id.
173. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3)(b)(1) (2007).
174. See id. § 18-69(b)(2).
175. Id. § 18-69(3)(d)(1).
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documentation described in section 18-69(4)(d)(1) consists of any documentation
required under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a that was not provided during the initial inspection
or audit.
Even though LEO may avoid the problem of insufficient notice by connecting
its documentation requirements with federal law, LEO may still be too vague in
specifying the nature of the required information. 176 IRCA requires employers to
review original documents chosen by the employee from the 1-9 Form's list of
acceptable documents and to keep a copy of the 1-9 Form to verify identity and
employment eligibility. 177 IRCA does not require employers to retain copies of
those documents after the 1-9 verification is complete. 178 Therefore, the question
becomes whether the 1-9 Form would qualify as sufficient employment verification
documentation for purposes of a county investigation of a business under LEO.
LEO is unclear in this respect.
If the employer's policy does not include retaining copies of the original
documents presented, then the employer may risk charges of discrimination by
requesting those documents from the employee again. 17' This second request would,
in effect, amount to reverifying the employee despite the fact that the employer was
already satisfied with the first verification. Such reverification may be directly
contrary to IRCA. 180 Because LEO does not specify whether production of a copy
of the 1-9 Form is sufficient to meet the verification requirements under section 18-
69(3)(B)(1), this could present an additional problem in providing proper notice to
employers.
This ambiguity in LEO probably would not prove fatal under a due process
challenge. If LEO is interpreted merely to require an 1-9 verification form, then its
requirements are identical to that of IRCA, which likely would equate to sufficient
notice. However, if LEO were interpreted as requiring more than the 1-9 Form (e.g.,
the original documents), then this provision probably would not be challenged
under the Due Process Clause but likely would be challenged as being preempted
by federal law.'8' Therefore, by only requiring documents already required by
federal law, LEO seemingly provides sufficient notice to employers despite LEO's
potential vagueness regarding the nature of the required documents.
176. See id. § 18-69(3).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (2000) (requiring employers to "retain the [verification] form and
make it available for inspection").
178. See id.
179. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). Section 1324b(a)(6) provides, "A person's or other entity's
request..o for more or different documents than are required under such section or refusing to honor
documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine shall be treated as an unfair
immigration-related employment practice ... ." Id.
180. See id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A). Specifically, section 1324a(b)(1)(A) provides the following:
If an individual provides a document or combination of documents that
reasonably appears on its face to be genuine and that is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the first sentence of this paragraph, nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed as requiring the person or entity to solicit the production of any other
document or as requiring the individual to produce such another document.
Id.
181. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (determining that
the Hazleton ordinance was preempted because it "supplement[ed] the requirements of federal law").
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The IIRA also failed to provide adequate notice to employees affected by the
ordinance.1 2 In this regard, Beaufort County's ordinance is likewise inadequate. As
discussed above, LEO appears to provide ample notice to the employer. However,
as expressed by Lozano, notice to the employee is also a great concern.'83 The court
expressed its fear that, when faced with a complaint filed with the city, an employer
in Hazleton may simply choose to fire the allegedly unauthorized employee rather
than determining the employee's actual status as an immigrant.'84 Under the I1RA,
the employee in this scenario had no protection." 5 Though structured differently,
the fact that Beaufort County's ordinance also fails to provide notice to the
employee may spell trouble for LEO.
In addition to the lack of adequate notice, the Lozano court found that the I1RA
failed to give due process in its provision for judicial review of the city's
determination of an alien's immigration status.'8 6 Under Hazleton's Illegal
Immigration Relief Act Implementation Amendment (Implementation
Amendment), which the city council added to the IIRA on December 28, 2006,87
an employer or employee subject to a complaint could "challenge the enforcement
of [the IIRA] with respect to such entity or individual in the [magisterial district
court], subject to the right of appeal to the [county court]."'8 8 However, the court
found this problematic, because "[t]he Pennsylvania courts ... do not have the
authority to determine an alien's immigration status."' 89 The court emphasized that
this determination "can only be [made] by an immigration judge."'9 Thus, the court
concluded, "[The] IIRA attempts to provide procedural protection to those affected
by it by resorting to courts that do not have jurisdiction over determinations of
immigration status. [This] is a violation of due process. '
On the one hand, if the court's analysis of the Implementation Amendment is
correct, then the Beaufort County ordinance appears to raise similar concerns.
Section 3(f) of LEO provides, "Appeal of the business license division's findings
and the suspension of a license is available as provided under Beaufort County
Ordinance [Code] section 18-63.,,192 Section 18-63 establishes the general appeals
process, which provides, "Any person aggrieved by a final assessment or a denial
of a business license under this article by the license inspector may appeal the
decision to county council."' 93 If an appeal to the Hazleton magisterial district court
182. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
183. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. at 536 ("[The] IIRA fails to require that anyone provide notice to
an employee when a complaint is filed or at any time during the proceedings.").
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 536 37.
187. See id. at 484.
188. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 § 7(F) (Dec. 28,2006), available athttp://www.prldeforg/
Civil/Hazelton/hazleton%201egal%20documents/2006-40%20_II RA%201mplementation%20
Amendment .pdf The Implementation Amendment further provided, "Such an entity or individual may
alternatively challenge the enforcement of [the IIRA] with respect to such entity or individual in any
other court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with applicable law, subject to all rights of appeal."
Id.
189. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
190. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2000)).
191. Id. at 536-37.
192. BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3)(f) (2007).
193. Id. § 18-63(a).
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or county court raises due process concerns for lack of jurisdiction,'94 the same
likely would be true of an appeal to the Beaufort County Council.
On the other hand, the Lozano court arguably misinterpreted the
Implementation Amendment, and thus LEO may not be vulnerable onj urisdictional
grounds. The court seemingly ignores section (G) of the Implementation
Amendment, which specifically provides that "the determination of whether a
worker is an unauthorized alien shall be made by the federal government, pursuant
to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c)."'' 9 5 Subsection 1373(c) requires
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to "respond to an inquiry by a Federal,
State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any
purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status
information.' 9'6 While the court construed the Implementation Amendment as a
usurpation of the immigration judge's role in determining whether an alien may be
admitted or removed from the country, 197 a fair reading of the IIRA as a whole
seems to suggest no such intention or effect. The lIRA's enforcement action and
any subsequent appeal of such action are not meant to determine the immigration
status of an alien-whether the alien should be admitted or removed-but merely
to ascertain apreviously determined status. By directly referencing § 1373(c), it is
difficult to see how Hazleton, as a "local government agency," is doing anything
more than inquiring into an individual's immigration status-an inquiry expressly
allowed under § 1373(c).
198
The same is true of Beaufort County's ordinance. LEO creates a system to
ensure that employers meet the documentation requirements set forth under federal
law.' 99 The language of LEO evidences this concern: the investigation commences
if a "licensee does not meet the documentation requirements contained in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a"; 20 1 the enforcement action is commenced only if the "licensee fails to
produce the required documentation" upon request;2' and the licensee is permitted
to submit "additional documentation to support that the alleged unauthorized alien
is authorized to work in the United States. 20 2 While subsection 3(b)(3) does
indicate that the required documentation is submitted to the federal government for
verification pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, that provision also requires the License
Division only to notify the licensee-rather than suspend the license or penalize the
licensee. 2 3 Furthermore, LEO ultimately suspends a license only where "the
licensee fails to provide additional documentation or if the license inspector finds
the additional documentation does not meet the requirements of 8 U.S.C.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 186 91.
195. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40, at § 7(G) (Dec. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Hazelton/hazleton 201egal %20documents/2006-40 /20-11RA%20
Implementation%20Amendment .pdf
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2000).
197. See Lo ano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37.
198. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
199. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3) (2007).
200. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(1).
201. Id. § 18-69(3)(b)(2).
202. Id. § 18-69(3)(d)(1).
203. See id. § 18-69(3)(b)(3).
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§ 1324a., 20 4 Thus, should an appeal be made to the county council under subsection
3(f), the matter for review by the council would be whether the documentation
requirements are met, not whether the alien's status is one requiring admission or
deportation. 2 5 However, the Lozano decision appears to stand for the proposition
that even this type of appellate review would not satisfy due process.2 6
C. The Lawful Employment Ordinance and Equal Protection
Critics ofthese local immigration reforms have raised concerns about potential
equal protection violations.2 7 The national context in which many of these reforms
have taken place leads to a valid fear that immigration legislation will result in
racial profiling and that these ordinances will inevitably have a discriminatory
effect on certain groups within the community, particularly Hispanic and Mexican-
American immigrants.2 °8
The IIRA created a complaint-based enforcement action, where any person or
business entity could file a complaint alleging a violation by either an employer or
an employee.2 °9 Once a valid complaint was filed, the enforcement action was
commenced immediately.210 Further, the IIRA allowed the city to suspend the
business permit of the alleged violating employer if the employer did not provide
proper identification information within three days of the city's request.21' LEO, on
the other hand, provides for an enforcement action only as a result of an inspection
or audit performed by the county, and the enforcement action begins only after the
licensee has failed to produce the required documents requested by the License
Division.212 The complaint-based scheme of the IIRA seemed to center more on an
alleged violator, while LEO centers on failures to meet documentation
requirements. 2 3Because LEO's enforcement action is initiated based on inadequate
documentation rather than on allegations regarding specific individuals, the
possibility of discriminatory enforcement actions is significantly diminished.
Even if a court were not to draw such a distinction between the ordinances,
LEO likely would withstand an equal protection challenge under the Lozano court's
analysis. LEO is a facially neutral policy, and as discussed above, a plaintiff would
204. Id. § 18-69(3)(e)(1).
205. See id. § 18-69(3)(f).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 187 91.
207. See Parlow, supra note 13, at 1072.
208. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 509 n.31 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that
the ordinances in Hazleton "had the effect of increasing racial tension in the City"); Conley &
Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 40 ("Hispanic residents [in Hazleton] have moved; businesses catering to
Latinos have closed due to lack of patrons; and individuals who look and sound foreign now know or
at least feel they are not welcome in Hazleton.").
209. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(1) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www. smalltowndefenders. com/090806/2006-18 / 20-Illegal / 2OAlien / 20lmmigration / 20
Reliefo20Act.pdf
210. See id. § 4(B)(3).
211. Id. § 4(B)(4).
212. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(3)(e)(1) (2007).
213. Compare Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 4(B)(1) (stating that a valid complaint must
describe the alleged violator and the actions constituting the violation), with BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C.,
CODE § 18-69(3)(e)(1) (noting that a licensee is subject to license suspension if the licensee fails to
provide the requisite documentation upon request).
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have to prove that the ordinances were motivated by a discriminatory purpose in
order to succeed on an equal protection claim.214 In Lozano, the court found that the
JIRA did not implicate a fundamental right and was therefore subject only to the
rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny.21 Like the IIRA, LEO was enacted to
address the problem of the unlawful employment of illegal aliens. Both ordinances
note in their Findings and Declaration of Purpose sections that the unlawful
employment of illegal aliens "harms the health, safety and welfare" of the local
citizens.2 16 To address these findings, both ordinances view the measures enacted
as prohibiting and deterring activities that further the employment of unauthorized
aliens.217 Lozano found that Hazleton's goals and policies were rationally related,218
and there is no reason why the same would not be true of Beaufort County's LEO
as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Forecasting the long-term repercussions Lozano will have on proposed
immigration reforms is a difficult task. On the one hand, the decision likely will
slow the wave of efforts led by local officials that rushed to solve the immigration
problem on their own. Numerous counties and municipalities around the country,
many of whom modeled local immigration ordinances after Hazleton, are already
withdrawing or repealing their attempts to regulate immigration at the local level.219
Not only does Lozano indicate a possibility that a local ordinance may not be
upheld in court,2 20 but the threat of being tapped with the legal costs associated with
214. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
215. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 542 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("[O]ur equal
protection analysis must only explore whether [the] IIRA has 'arational relationship to alegitimate state
interest."' (quoting Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 53 (3d Cir. 1985))).
216. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 2(C) ("[U]nlawful employment ... of illegal
aliens... harm[s] the health, safety and welfare of authorized US workers and legal residents in the City
of Hazleton."); Beaufort County, S.C., Ordinance 2006/31, at § I(B)(2) (Dec. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.bcgov.net/news/lllegal /201mmigration /20Relief%20Act/31 / 20Lawful /20
Employment.pdf ("The employment of unauthorized aliens harms the health, safety and welfare of
persons authorized to work in Beaufort County .... ").
217. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 2(D) ("[T]he City of Hazleton is... empowered
and mandated by the people of Hazleton to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by diligently
prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate illegal immigration .... "); Beaufort County, S.C.,
Ordinance 2006/31, at § 1 (B)(4) (finding that the ordinance will "deter and prevent employment of
unauthorized aliens"). The two ordinances vary slightly in their terminology. The Hazleton ordinance
uses the term "unlawful worker," which it defines to mean "a person who does not have the legal right
or authorization to work due to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or local law, including
but not limited to . . . an unauthorized alien as defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection
1324a(h)(3)." Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, at § 3(E). Beaufort County does not use the term
"unlawful worker" but instead uses "unauthorized alien" and adopts the definition given by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(h)(3) (2000). See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE § 18-69(1 )(a)(7). Section 1324a(h)(3) defines
"unauthorized alien" to mean an alien who, at the time of employment, is not either "(A) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by
the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3).
218. See supra notes 116 17 and accompanying text.
219. See Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 14 (noting that a "growing list of municipalities
nationwide" are reconsidering laws that penalize the employment of illegal immigrants).
220. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 40 (suggesting that ordinances similar to
Hazleton's "presumably are doomed to the same fate" as the IIRA).
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defending the ordinances from potential legal challenges is enough to make most
small-budget municipalities think twice. 221 In addition to Hazleton, several cities
have received national attention for legal challenges to their ordinances.222 Given
the fact that the ACLU opposes these attempts to set and enforce immigration
policies at the local level, 2 23 presumably, the ACLU and similar organizations will
continue litigating all ordinances that resemble the Hazleton model.
On the other hand, Lozano probably will not serve as a complete deterrent to
local reforms. The City of Hazleton has already filed an appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the mayor of Hazleton has vowed
to appeal the case all the way to the Supreme Court.22 4 Moreover, the district court's
ruling is binding only in Pennsylvania,22' and there is no guarantee that a South
Carolina court or the Fourth Circuit will find Lozano persuasive.
In South Carolina, the effects of Lozano could extend much further than just
to Beaufort County. Cities and counties across the state maintained a watchful eye
on Beaufort County as LEO was drafted 226 and will continue to observe its
implementation. 227 In addition to Beaufort County, Pickens County, 228 Dorchester
County, 229 and the City of Clemson 230 have all passed or begun consideration of
immigration-related ordinances. The local immigration reforms are not limited to
South Carolina's counties and municipalities. The state legislature has also begun
to take action that would further regulate illegal immigration on a state level, 231' and
221. See Milan Simonich, Attorneys Want Hafleton to Pay Fees: Small Town Fights Back,
Appeals Ruling that Its Immigration Laws Were Unconstitutional, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 2007,
at B3, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07248/814665-85.stm (reporting that the thirty-
seven attorneys who assisted the plaintiffs in Lo ano are now asking Hazleton to pay their attorney fees
of nearly $2.4 million).
222. See Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 14 (reporting on recent litigation over similar ordinances
in Farmers Branch, Texas; Valley Park, Missouri: and Riverside, New Jersey).
223. See ACLU, LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCE CASES, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/
discrim/27848res20070105.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
224. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 40.
225. See id.
226. See Phillips, supra note 123 ("Counties across South Carolina are watching as Beaufort
forges into territory long left to the federal government.").
227. See Jeremy Hsieh, Audits to FindIllegal Workers WillProceed, BEAUFORT GAZETTE (S.C.),
June 29, 2007, at IA (reporting that the Beaufort County Council intends to proceed with "[m]ass audits
of Beaufort County businesses to root out illegal workers").
228. See Scott Keeler, Pickens Council Takes Step to Halt Hiring of Illegals, GREENVILLE NEWS
(S.C.), Sept. 18, 2007, at 2A (reporting that the Pickens County Council voted to begin drafting an
ordinance that would prevent businesses from hiring illegal immigrants).
229. See Phillips, supra note 123 (reporting that Dorchester County has begun debating an
ordinance modeled after the ordinance originally proposed in Beaufort County).
230. See Anna Simon, Tensions Rise over Immigration Plan in Clemson, GREENVILLE NEWS
(S.C.), July 3,2007, at IA (reporting that the Clemson City Council is considering aproposed ordinance
that would prohibit the city from doing business with any entity that knowingly hires illegal aliens).
231. Governor Sanford has already signed into law South Carolina Senate Bill 449, declaring that
"[t]he State shall not participate in the implementation of the federal REAL ID Act." See Act of June
13, 2007, No. 70, § 1, 2007 S.C. Acts 295, 295 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-85). The
senate adopted a resolution requesting that the Governor issue an executive order declaring that the
Department of Social Services or any other state agency may not provide any services or assistance to
illegal aliens. See S. Res. 531, 117th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl 17 2007-2008/prever/531_20070307.htm. In addition, there are
several bills pending in the South Carolina legislature, such as the "South Carolina Illegal Immigration
Reform Act," that would create statewide immigration laws, the passage of which may have direct
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the General Assembly's agenda for the 2008 session likewise appears to be focused
heavily on immigration.232
What is clear is that municipalities and counties across the state, as well as
South Carolina's legislature, must proceed cautiously and carefully should they
decide to regulate immigration on the local level.233 While federal legislation does
seem to provide some avenues for enforcement at the local level, states and cities
must consider constitutional issues like federal preemption and avoid legislation
that is beyond the scope of their governing authority. Enforcement of these laws
must comport with the Due Process Clause, giving proper notice and the
opportunity to be heard. Should such a law be challenged, the court will scrutinize
the governing body's actions carefully to determine whether the law was enacted
with discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Failure to
consider these issues will likely result in the same judicial annulment that befell
Hazleton, Pennsylvania-a fate local governments in South Carolina surely wish
to avoid. While attempting to reform immigration from the ground up may seem
superior to any reform the federal government enacted, Lozano may in fact signal
that local immigration regulation efforts will go to a far better rest than its
opponents could have ever known.
Jason P. Luther
effects on local ordinances. See S. 392, 117th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007) (referred to H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl 17_2007-
2008/prever/392 20070420.htm.
232. See Noelle Phillips, Immigration Tops List: Lawmakers Line Up Bills to Regulate Illegal
Immigration; Critics Say It Is Federal Issue, STATE, Jan. 6, 2008, at Al (reporting that there are
currently at least thirty-five bills regarding immigration up for consideration in the 2008 session).
233. In addition to implementing local immigration reforms, states, cities, and special interest
groups should lobby Congress for an amendment to IRCA's preemption clause that would clarify the
"licensing and similar laws" provision in order to ensure that their efforts are not preempted by federal
law. While Congress may not be able to pass any comprehensive immigration reform, a simple
amendment to the preemption clause in IRCA would allow cities and municipalities more leeway and
provide them with more authority to enforce federal laws on a local level. Through the power of local
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